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8 March 1957

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
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4. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT FEARS EAST INDONESIAN COUP IS STEP TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

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The Indonesian government and army chief of staff Nasution are more concerned over the East Indonesian coup of 2 March than they have been over the Sumatran disaffection, [redacted]

They fear

that the East Indonesian move for greater autonomy is only the first step toward an eventual declaration of independence, and Nasution believes that a stiff stand by Djakarta would hasten such a development.

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Lt. Col. Samual, territorial commander in East Indonesia, has the support of traditional local rulers who have consistently been opposed to the central government. Most veterans of the former Netherlands Indonesian army are in East Indonesia, and Nasution considers them to be sufficiently well trained to form an army which would undoubtedly support a move for independence. East Indonesia is also believed to be in a better position economically to maintain itself than Sumatra. The central government also regards as a disquieting feature the proximity of Netherlands-controlled West New Guinea, which would facilitate Dutch aid.

Comment

The Djakarta government sent army negotiators to Makassar, East Indonesian army headquarters, on 6 March. If negotiations fail, it may attempt a coup using Colonel Sudirman, a Javanese officer stationed in East Indonesia who has not committed himself to Samual's action. Sudirman holds a special operational command composed of nine battalions, most of them Javanese, in South Celebes and is under central rather than local army authority. These forces make up approximately one fourth of the army forces in East Indonesia.

5. SUEZ CANAL TOLLS ISSUE CONSIDERED CRUCIAL TO AMERICAN PRESTIGE IN BRITAIN

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[redacted] If Britain is required to pay tolls directly to Egypt after the Suez Canal opens, the result would be disastrous to the United States' standing in Britain, Ambassador Whitney reports following a conversation

on 6 March with Lord Salisbury, influential Leader of the House of Lords.

Whitney and Salisbury discussed the "distressing lack of improvement in Anglo-American feeling." Salisbury analyzed anti-American feeling as a "simmering pot nearly ready to boil." The United States would be given the whole blame if tolls were to be paid directly to Egypt, Salisbury suggested, even if the United States opposed it.

Comment

Lord Salisbury's statements underline the widespread British view that the United States is not putting sufficient pressure on Nasr, and that the Suez crisis may therefore result in a total defeat for Britain.

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**8. TRAINING PROGRAM IN SOVIET ARMS ESTABLISHED
IN KABUL**

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[Redacted] Five training courses on the use of Soviet arms are being conducted in Kabul for Afghan officers, according to an Afghan army officer. He said there are 80 officers in the antiaircraft course, 55 in the field artillery course, 100 in the mortars course, 150 in the infantry course, and an unknown number in the antitank course. Some of the courses, which are to last for six months, are conducted by Russian officers.

The American army attaché has noted several hundred Afghan officers entering school buildings near the Ministry of Defense every day.

Comment Substantial quantities of ground forces equipment are believed to have reached Afghanistan under the Soviet-Afghan arms agreement. The USSR reportedly is also developing a training program for the air force. Afghan officers are also being trained by Turkey and the United States.

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9. CAMBODIA SHOWS GROWING AWARENESS OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION THREAT

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Concern over Communist influence in Cambodia as well as a desire to take corrective measures appears to be growing in the Cambodian government. The strongly anti-Communist minister of national security, Dap Chhuon, is taking an increasingly bold stand against a policy of accommodation with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Prince Sihanouk, who has been the chief proponent of closer relations with the bloc, seems to be moving toward a policy of repression of Communist political activity in Cambodia. The open subversion of the local Overseas Chinese community by Communist agents operating in defiance of repeated Cambodian government warnings seems to have made a particularly profound impression on the prince. Suggestive of this change in Sihanouk's outlook is his reported endorsement of closer Cambodian-South Vietnamese relations, including joint security operations against dissident Vietnamese and Viet Minh bands in the border area.

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10. ATTEMPT MAY BE MADE TO OVERTHROW HAITI'S LATEST PRESIDENT

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A leading Haitian businessman informed the American embassy on 4 March that an incident aimed at overthrowing Provisional President Franck Sylvain would develop this week. The embassy adds that this incident may be set off by a strike of supporters of Daniel Fignole, radical presidential candidate, who was detained briefly on 5 March for an attempt to violate the ban on political broadcasts.

According to some observers, army chief of staff Cantave and presidential aspirant Jumelle have been looking for an incident which would permit the army to intervene and maintain public order, ousting Sylvain in the process. Jumelle, who is supported by Cantave, has been reported co-operating with Fignole.

An attempt to oust Sylvain might lead to serious civil disturbances between the supporters of the several presidential candidates and possibly between various factions in the army.

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**11. AUSTRIA RESTRICTS UN COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING HUNGARY**

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[REDACTED]

The Austrian Foreign Ministry has told the UN committee on Hungary that it may not interrogate refugees in Austria, although it is welcome to conduct investigations. According to a Foreign Ministry official, Austria's "precarious relationship with the Soviet bloc" is the real reason for the government's stand, although it has explained the decision on the ground that it fears disturbances in the refugee camps.

Comment

There have been other indications recently that the strong Soviet criticism of Austria's "unneutrality" is getting on Vienna's nerves. The government initially instructed its UN delegation to abstain on the Soviet resolution charging the US with instigating the Hungarian revolt and was persuaded to be absent instead only after strong representations from the US that abstention would be widely misunderstood.

Foreign Minister Figl, moreover, is said to have accepted as authentic a recent report of Hungarian pressure for Soviet reoccupation of Austria--a report which Ambassador Thompson believes was a deliberate plant in the "war of nerves."

[REDACTED]

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No: 344

ANNEX

Watch Report 344, 7 March
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is improbable in the immediate future. Unsettled issues and continuing tensions in the area constitute possibilities for violence.

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